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Acceptance and interpretation of Dharmakīrti's theory  
of nigrahasthāna in the Nyāyamañjarī * 
SASAKI Ryō 
1. Introduction 
The Nyāyasūtra (NS) systematically arranged the theory of debate – including “the condition of 
defeat” (nigrahasthāna)1, which is the rule to determine victory or defeat in a debate – for the first time 
in the history of Indian thought.2 The Nyāyabhā"ya (NBh), Vātsyāyana's commentary on NS, and the 
Nyāyavārttika (NV), Uddyotakara's commentary on NBh, cultivated the thought of debate. 
On the other hand, the Vādanyāya (VN), a philosophical work by Dharmakīrti, criticized the 
definition of “the condition of defeat” presented in the Nyāya school (NS, NBh, NV) and uniquely 
redefined the term from the position of the theory of Buddhist logic.3 
VN was translated and critically edited by M. T. Much in 1991 (Much [1991]); he presented the 
comprehensive results of VN research up until that point, marking a significant contribution to research 
on the text. However, very few attempts have been made to examine the Nyāya school's criticism or 
acceptance of the theory in VN. In this paper, I will consider the way of accepting Dharmakīrti's theory 
found in the Nyāyamañjarī (NM), which is Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's commentary on NS. 
 
2. The Theory of Nigrahasthāna in the Vādanyāya 
2.1. The Definition of Nigrahasthāna 
Dharmakīrti defined “the condition of defeat” at the beginning of VN as follows: 
 
VN 1,4–5: asādhanā)gavacanam adoṣodbhāvanaṃ dvayoḥ /  
nigrahasthānam anyat tu na yuktam iti neṣyate //1//  
                                                                  
* This paper was partly read at the 17th Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 
(IABS), August, 18–23, 2014, University of Vienna, Austria. 
 
1 See Ono [2006], Todeschini [2010] etc.. 
2 See Kajiyama [1984], Katsura [2000], Preisendanz [2000] etc.. 
3 See Much [1986, 1991], Chinchore [1988], Gokhale [1993], Sasaki [2012a, 2012b, 2013a, 2013b, 
2014] etc.. 
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Asādhanā(gavacana and ado"odbhāvana4 are the conditions of defeat (nigrahasthāna) for the two 
(debaters, i.e., a proponent and an opponent, respectively)5. However, other [conditions of defeat 
that the Nyāya school and the like explain]6 are not correct, hence [they are] not accepted7. 
 
Here Dharmakīrti presents his original idea of dividing “the condition of defeat” into 
asādhanā(gavacana (the condition of defeat for a proponent) and ado"odbhāvana (the condition of 
defeat for an opponent). These two terms are core concepts in the theory of debate constructed in VN. 
In the first half of VN (pp. 1–24), many issues related to the interpretations of these two concepts 
are considered. Ultimately, the former is shown to have five types of interpretations and the latter two 
types of interpretations. On the other hand, the twenty-two types of “the condition of defeat” 
established by the Nyāya school are criticized individually in the latter half of VN (pp. 25–68), with 
consideration given to the interpretations presented earlier in the first half . 
 
2.2. Nigrahasthāna by Dharmakīrti in the First Half of VN 
First, Dharmakīrti provided five interpretations of asādhanā(gavacana in the first half of VN. 
These five interpretations are arranged in Table 1 below. See Sasaki [2012b] for more details. 
                                                                  
4 It is difficult to accurately translate the technical terms “asādhanā(gavacana” and “ado"odbhāvana” 
without a certain context because Dharmakīrti intended to present grammatically and semantically 
diverse interpretations of these two compound words in order to define the condition of defeat from 
diversified perspectives. In this paper, I will provide a suitable translation of these words when the 
meaning of them can be determined by their actual use in a sentence. However, if their meaning is 
difficult to determine, I will use the original Sanskrit word as it is. 
5 See VA 3,5–6: asādhanāgavacanam adoodbhāvana ca dvayor vādiprativādinor yathākramaṃ 
nigrahasthāna parājayādhikaraṇam. (Asādhanā(gavacana and ado"odbhāvana are the conditions of 
defeat, namely the grounds for defeat for the two [debaters,] i.e., a proponent and an opponent, 
respectively.) 
6 See VA 3,6–8: anyat tv ity etaddvayavyatiriktam(1) akṣapādaparikalpitaṃ pratijñāsaṃnyāsādikaṃ 
vakṣyamāṇaṃ nigrahasthānaṃ na yuktam iti kṛtvā neyate. nigrahasthānam iti vartate ((1) etaddvaya° 
VAMS. em. [P1 23a8, P2 73a1, D 52b4: gnyis po de dag las] : etaddheya° VA.) (“However, other ...” is 
[annotated as below]. The conditions of defeat – which are distinct from these two [asādhanā(ga-
vacana and ado"odbhāvana], are made by Akṣapāda, are [constituted by] “abandonment of a thesis” 
and the like, and are to be mentioned [in the latter half of VN] – are not accepted because they are 
considered not to be correct. [Thus] “conditions of defeat” are supplemented.) 
7 At the beginning of the latter half of VN (VN 25,1), after mentioning line c and d of this verse, it is 
stated as below. VN 25,2–3: yatredaṃ yathoktaṃ nigrahasthānalakṣaṇaṃ nāsti, tasya nigraha-
sthānatvam ayuktam iti noktam asmābhiḥ. (When something does not have this definition of the 
condition of defeat mentioned above, we do not mention [the thing] because it is not correct that it is the 
condition of defeat.) 
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 Table 1 
Dharmakīrti's interpretations of asādhanāgavacana 
Resolution Interpretation Translation and Definition 
 
 
 
sādhanā(gasya 
avacanam 
 
 
1st interpretation 
tr. : not stating the factor of proof 
def. : (1) not stating any logical reasons  
(2) not stating a justified logical reason (svabhāvahetu, 
kāryahetu, anupalabdhihetu)  
  
 
 2nd interpretation 
tr. : not stating the element of the means of proof 
def. : (1) in regard to the three conditions of the logical reason, 
not stating either the first or second conditions 
(2) not stating either the first or third conditions 
 
  
 
3rd interpretation 
tr. : stating what is not the element of the means of proof 
def. : (1) stating a thesis, an application, or a conclusion  
(2) stating a second positive concomitance or a second 
negative concomitance  
 
asādhanā(gasya 
vacanam 
 
4th interpretation 
tr. : stating what is not the factor of proof 
def. : (1) stating a fallacious logical reason  
(2) stating a fallacious example 
 
  
5th interpretation 
tr. : stating what does not have proof as the factor 
def. : stating what is not the topic  
 
Secondly, Dharmakīrti showed two interpretations of ado"odbhāvana. These two interpretations 
are arranged in Table 2 below. See Sasaki [2013a] for more details. 
 
 Table 2 
Dharmakīrti's interpretations of adoodbhāvana 
Resolution Interpretation Translation and Definition 
 
do"asya 
anudbhāvanam 
 
 
1st interpretation 
tr. : not pointing out the fault 
def. : (1) not pointing out “insufficient” (nyūna) 
(2) not pointing out an unproved reason, an inconclusive 
reason, a contradictory reason, and so forth  
ado"asya 
udbhāvanam 
 
2nd interpretation 
tr. : pointing out the non-fault 
def. : making an incorrect response (jātyuttara) and so forth 
 
 
After the condition of defeat was defined as indicated by the tables in the first half of VN, 
Dharmakīrti critically considered the Nyāya school's twenty-two different conditions of defeat in the 
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latter half of VN. In the latter half of VN, although the majority of the Nyāya school's conditions of 
defeat were not accepted as correct conditions of defeat, some of their conditions of defeat were 
admitted to be correct.  
It is expected that the conditions of defeat defined by Dharmakīrti in the first half of VN 
correspond with the Nyāya school's conditions of defeat that Dharmakīrti admitted to be correct in the 
latter half of VN. However, Dharmakīrti did not expressly explain the concrete content of the 
relationship between these two sets of conditions of defeat in VN. Therefore, we ourselves have to 
analyze the relationship in accordance with the context of VN. 
 
2.3. Comparison between the First Half of VN and the Latter Half of VN 
I compared the first half of VN with the latter half and demonstrated the correspondence 
relationship between Dharmakīrti's conditions of defeat and the Nyāya school's conditions of defeat in 
Sasaki [2013b, 2014]. 
First, the correspondence relationship between the conditions of defeat defined by Dharmakīrti 
himself and the Nyāya school's conditions of defeat that Dharmakīrti admitted to be correct are 
arranged in Table 3 below.8  
 
 Table 3 
Dharmakīrti's interpretation of the Nyāya school's nigrahasthāna (1) 
Nyāya school's nigrahasthāna  
which Dharmakīrti admits to be correct  
Nigrahasthāna defined by Dharmakīrti 
?6?Different affair (arthāntara)  5th interpretation of asādhanā(gavacana 
 2nd interpretation of ado"odbhāvana 
?11?Insufficient (nyūna)  1st interpretation of asādhanā(gavacana 
 2nd interpretation of asādhanā(gavacana  
?12?Surplus (adhika)  3rd interpretation of asādhanā(gavacana 
?16?Lack of an idea (apratibhā)  1st interpretation of ado"odbhāvana 
?22?Fallacious logical reason (hetvābhāsa)  4th interpretation of asādhanā(gavacana 
 
                                                                  
8 The condition of defeat is established against a background of specific theories of logic; furthermore, 
Dharmakīrti and the Nyāya school depend on two different theories of logic. Therefore, even if the 
conditions of defeat accord for both of them, we cannot anticipate that their conditions of defeat are 
consistent with each other in every detail. 
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On the other hand, Dharmakīrti rejected the majority of the Nyāya school's conditions of defeat 
because he thought that most of them should not be classified as different types of conditions of defeat 
separate from other conditions of defeat. This is arranged below in Table 4. 
 
 Table 4 
Dharmakīrti's interpretation of the Nyāya school's nigrahasthāna (2) 
Nyāya schools's nigrahasthāna 
which Dharmakīrti rejects 
Nyāya school's nigrahasthāna 
which should not be classified as different 
types (according to a certain interpretation) 
 
?1? pratijñāhāni  ?22? 
?2? pratijñāntara ?5? 
?3? pratijñāvirodha ?22? 
?4? pratijñāsa%nyāsa ?22? 
?5? hetvantara ?22? 
?7? nirarthaka ?6??12??22? 
?8? avijñātārtha ?7? 
?9? apārthaka ?7? 
?10? aprāptakāla ?9? 
?13? punarukta ?12? 
?14? ananubhā"a&a ?16? 
?15? ajñāna ?16? 
?17? vik"epa ?6??7??9??16??22? 
?18? matānujñā ?16? 
?19? paryanuyojyopek"a&a ?16? 
?20? niranuyojyānuyoga ?16??22? 
?21? apasiddhānta ?22? 
 
3. Mutual Acceptance between Dharmakīrti and the Nyāya School  
The question we have to ask here is how the Nyāya school responded to Dharmakīrti's opinion. I 
will confirm Dharmakīrti's way of accepting the Nyāya school's conditions of defeat and pick up 
Jayanta's response to Dharmakīrti's assertion as an example of the Nyāya school's answer. 
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3.1. Consideration of “Different Affair” (arthāntara) 
The sixth condition of defeat defined in NS is “different affair” (arthāntara). 
 
NS 5.2.7 (Ci'e VN 40,9): prakṛtād arthād apratisaṃbaddhārtham arthāntaram // 
“Different affair” is an affair which is not related with the affair under discussion. 
 
“Different affair” can be explained as follows9: One debater states, “Sound is permanent because 
it is not an object of a tactile organ. And the reason (hetu) is the word with the k't-suffix when the tu- is 
added to the root hi-. And the word (pada) is the noun, the verb, the prefix, and the copula. And the 
noun (nāman) is ….” Here the explanation of “the reason,” “the word,” and “the noun” is irrelevant to 
the affair under discussion. Therefore, the debater stating such an irrelevant affair is to be defeated 
because of the condition of “different affair,” the sixth condition of defeat. 
In regard to this thought of the Nyāya school, Dharmakīrti wholly admitted the “different affair” 
to be a correct condition of defeat. 
 
VN 40,16–41,4: nyāyyam etan nigrahasthānaṃ pūrvottarapakṣavādinoḥ, pratipādite doṣe prakṛtaṃ 
parityajyāsādhanā)gavacanam adoṣodbhāvanaṃ ca. sādhanavādino hy upanyastasādhanasya 
samarthane kartavye tad akṛtvāparasya prasa)genāprasa)gena vātannāntarīyakasyāpy abhidhānaṃ 
parājayasthānam, uttaravādino 'pi doṣodbhāvanamātrād aparasyopakṣepa iti.  
This (= “different affair”) is a correct condition of defeat for both a former debater (= a proponent) 
and a latter debater (= an opponent). [In this case, the correct condition of defeat is] “stating what 
doesn't have proof as the factor” (asādhanā(gavacana) and “pointing out the non-fault” 
(ado"odbhāvana)10 after leaving the affair under discussion11 when a fault is [mutually] stated [by 
                                                                  
9 See VN 40,9–15. 
10 The interpretation of the meaning of this word is not found in VN and VA, but Much [1991: 78] 
translated ado"odbhāvana into “Nichtaufzeigen eines (begangenen) Fehlers;” furthermore, VN 21, 9–
23,6 is cited in the Much [1991: 78, Anm. 342]. That is to say, Much adopted the first interpretation of 
ado"odbhāvana, namely “not pointing out the fault.” However, here it seems to be natural for me to 
consider the case that an opponent states something because Dharmakīrti showed the expression “to 
mention something which is different from the mere comment on a fault” (do"odbhāvanamātrād 
aparasyopak"epa!) for the explanation of ado"odbhāvana. Therefore, I will adopt the second 
interpretation of ado"odbhāvana, i.e., “pointing out the non-fault” in this paper. 
11 See VA 99,15: praktam atra sādhyasādhanahetvabhidhānam. (Here the affair under discussion is 
the expression of the probandum and probans, namley the logical reason.) See Much [1991: 77, Anm. 
338]. 
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a proponent and an opponent]12. The reason is that it is the condition of defeat [for a proponent] to 
state a different [affair from the affair under discussion], i.e., even [the affair which has] no 
inseparability with it whether [the affair] has a connection [with it] or not without doing so (= 
proving his proof), although the debater of proof (= the proponent) has to establish the proof 
suggested [by himself]. For the latter debater (= the opponent) too, [it is the condition of defeat] to 
mention something which is different from the mere comment on a fault. 
 
“Different affair” is explained by Dharmakīrti as “stating a different affair.” Therefore, it is 
appropriate that asādhanā(gavacana in this case is resolved into asādhanā(gasya vacanam (the third, 
fourth, and fifth interpretation of asādhanā(gavacana). Based on the meaning of “different affair” for a 
proponent, we should conclude that it corresponds with the fifth interpretation of asādhanā(gavacana; 
namely, “stating what does not have proof as the factor,” i.e., “stating what is not the topic.”  
In the same way, ado"odbhāvana in this case should be resolved into ado"asya udbhāvanam. 
Therefore, “different affair” for an opponent corresponds with the second interpretation of 
ado"odbhāvana, which is “pointing out the non-fault,” i.e., “making an incorrect response (jātyuttara) 
and so forth.” 
 
NM 2.693.4–8: tad etad arthāntaraṃ nigrahasthānam asādhanā)gavacanam iti. kīrtināpy 
anumoditam dvayor api ca vādiprativādinoḥ prakṛtānanuguṇam abhidadhatoḥ bhavaty ado 
nigrahasthānam. yathākramam ekasya sādhanam anavadyam apaśyato dvitīyasya dūṣaṇam iti. 
This “different affair” is the condition of defeat, namely asādhanā(gavacana. Dharmakīrti also 
welcomed that this condition of defeat occurs to both a proponent and an opponent who state what 
is not suitable to [the affair] under discussion. [“To both a proponent and an opponent”] means, 
respectively, “To one [debater] who does not offer an unblamable proof and the second [debater 
who does not offer any] refutation.” 
 
Jayanta welcomed Dharmakīrti's acceptance of the Nyāya school's thought. In the same way as 
Dharmakīrti, Jayanta considered the “different affair” as asādhanā(gavacana and ado"odbhāvana.13 
 
                                                                  
12 See VA 98,26–27: pratipādite doe sati vādiprativādibhyām(1) anyonyam …. ((1) vādiprativādi° 
VA. : vādiprativādi° VAMS.) (when a fault is mutually stated by a proponent and an opponent, ….) 
13 It seems that Jayanta considered asādhanā(gavacana and ado"odbhāvana in the case of “different 
affair” as sādhanā(gasya avacanam and do"asya anudbhāvanam. Therefore, to be accurate, Jayanta's 
comprehension is supposed to be inaccurate based on the above-mentioned analysis of Dharmakīrti's 
thought. 
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3.2. Consideration of “Insufficient” (nyūna) 
 The eleventh condition of defeat defined in NS is “insufficient” (nyūna). 
 
NS 5.2.12 (Ci' VN 49,6): hīnam anyatamenāpy avayavena nyūnam // 
“Insufficient” (nyūna) is [an inferential statement] which lacks even a single component [of the 
five component parts]. 
 
“Insufficient” can be explained as follows14: The Nyāya school defines “insufficient” as the lack 
of any one of the five following component parts that comprise an inferential statement: a thesis 
(pratijñā), a logical reason (hetu), an example (udāhara&a), an application (upanaya), and a conclusion 
(nigamana). This definition is based on the perspective that all five parts are means of proof (sādhana) 
that are indispensable for establishing what is to be proven (sādhya)15. Therefore, if a proponent sets up 
an inferential statement without including even one of these components he will be defeated based on 
the condition of “insufficient,” the eleventh condition of defeat. 
In regard to this thought of the Nyāya school, Dharmakīrti constructed partial criticism as 
presented in the following text. 
 
VN 49,9–14: na pratijñānyūnaṃ hīnam, tadabhāve pratītibhāvād iti pratipāditam. hīnam eva tat, 
nyūnatāyām api nigrahād ity aparaḥ. yaḥ pratīyamānārtham anarthakaṃ śabdaṃ prayu)kte, sa 
nigraham arhet, nārthopasaṃhitasyābhidhātety asamīkṣitābhidhānam etat. ata eva ca pratijñāyā na 
sādhanā)gabhāva iti.  
It has been already explained16 that [an inferential statement for which] a thesis17 is insufficient is 
not lacking [in a means of proof] because apprehension takes place [even] when it (= a thesis) does 
not exist [in an inferential statement]. [On the other hand], another person (Uddyotakara)18 [insists 
that] it (= an inferential statement for which a thesis is insufficient) is certainly lacking [in a means 
                                                                  
14 See VN 49,6–8. 
15 See NV 1185, 6–7 (Ci'e VN 49, 6–8). 
16 See VN 17,9–11; 17,16–18,7. 
17 See VA 109,16: pratijñāgrahaṇam upalakṣaṇārthaṃ tenopanayanigamanayor api parigrahaḥ. (the 
expression of the “thesis” is [used] for the purpose of synecdoche. Even the “application” and the 
“conclusion” are also included by this (= the “thesis”).) 
18 As to who is the “another person” (apara), suggesting the possibility of Uddyotakara, Much [1991: 
89, Anm. 382] does not abandon other possibilities and avoided affirmation. It is difficult to decide who 
is he but I will temporarily regard him as Uddyotakara in this paper. 
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of proof] because defeat takes place even when [a thesis] is insufficient19. A person who makes a 
useless speech which is already known is to be defeated20 and is not a speaker of meaningful 
things. Therefore, this is a thoughtless remark [by Uddyotakara]21. From this very reason, the 
thesis is not the element of the means of proof.?
 
Dharmakīrti did not admit a thesis (pratijñā), an application (upanaya), and a conclusion 
(nigamana) to be the element of the means of proof. Therefore, even if an inferential statement lacks 
these three component parts, it is not insufficient in essential component parts according to his Buddhist 
logic.22 
However, Dharmakīrti's logic also considers a logical reason (hetu) and an example (udāhara&a / 
d'"$ānta) to be means of proof, which accords with the Nyāya school's logic. Actually, according to the 
first and second interpretation of asādhanā(gavacana, i.e., sādhanā(gasya avacanam, “not stating any 
logical reasons or three conditions of the logical reason”23 is defined as the condition of defeat. 
Additionally, the “example” is included in the “logical reason” concept in Dharmakīrti's logic.24 
                                                                  
19  See VA 109,16–18 udyotakarasya matam upanyasyati, hīnam eva tat pratijñānyūnam, tasyāḥ 
pratijñāyā nyūnatāyām api nigrahād iti. (The [following] opinion of Uddyotakara is mentioned; the 
[inferential statement for which] a thesis is insufficient is certainly lacking [in a means of proof] 
because defeat takes place even when the thesis is insufficient.) 
20 See VA 109,18–19: ya sādhanasāmarthyāt pratīyamānārtham anarthaka śabda sādhyā-
bhidhāyinaṃ sādhane prayukte, sa nigraham arhet. (In [the statement of] proof, a person who makes 
a useless speech which is expressing what should be proven (= a thesis) and is already known through 
indirect implication of the proof is to be defeated.) Furthermore, See the following explanation in HB. 
HB 5*,23f.: atra sāmarthyād eva pratijñārthasya pratīter na pratijñāyāḥ prayogaḥ.?Here (= in the logical 
formulation of similarity and dissimilarity), the meaning of a thesis is [fully] comprehended only 
through indirect implication. Therefore, the thesis [needs] not be used.) As to the translation of HB, See 
Steinkellner [1967: 40], Gokhale [1997: 17], Harada [1999: 2]. 
21 See VA 109,21–23: nārthopasahitasyayuktiyuktasya pakṣadharmasaṃbandhamātrasyābhidhāte-
ty(1) asamīkitābhidhānam etad vārtikakārasya. ((1) °ābhidhātety em. : °ābhidhānety VA; °ābhidhā-
bhidhānety VAMS.) ([The person] is not a speaker of meaningful, i.e., reasonable things which is just 
“the property of the subject [as the logical reason]” and “the connection [between the probans and the 
probandum]” (= the logical concomitance). Therefore, this is a thoughtless remark by the author of 
Nyāyavārttika (=Uddyotakara).) 
22 Not only that, Dharmakīrti thought that if a proponent states a thesis, an application, or a conclusion, 
he is to be defeated. See the third interpretation of asādhanā(gavacana. 
23 Dharmakīrti mentioned that “not stating three conditions of the logical reason” is the definition of 
“insufficiency” (nyūnatā) in Pramā&avārttika. PV IV 23: anuktāv api pakṣasya siddher aprati-
bandhataḥ / triṣv anyatamarūpasyaivānuktir nyūnatoditā // (Even if a thesis is not stated, establishment 
[of probandum] is not prevented. Therefore, it is said that “not speaking of any one condition of three 
[conditions of the logical reason]” is “insufficiency” (nyūnatā).) See Much [1991: 89, Anm. 383]. 
24 See NB III 121: trirūpo hetur uktaḥ / tāvatā cārthapratītir iti na pṛthag dṛṣṭānto nāma sādhanāvayavaḥ 
kaścit / tena nāsya lakṣaṇaṃ pṛthag ucyate gatārthatvāt // (The logical reason which has three conditions 
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Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that “insufficient” in the case of the logical reason and the 
example corresponds with the first and second interpretation of asādhanā(gavacana. 
 
NM 2.699.6–15: atrāha pratijñādyavayavajātam asādhanā)gavacanam ity ataḥ tad anabhidadhato 
na nigrahaḥ, pratyuta vadato nigraho yukta iti atrocyate anantaram evaitat parihṛtam, vistarataś 
cāvayavalakṣaṇe. tathā hi śrotur ākā)kṣānivṛttaye 'numānavākyaṃ prayujyata iti prathamaṃ 
tadākā)kṣāviṣayaḥ sādhyadharmaviśiṣṭo dharmo pradarśyate. tataḥ kāraṇākā)kṣāyāṃ hetuvacanam 
abhidhīyate. kvāsya pratibandho dṛṣṭa iti bubhutsāyāṃ udāharaṇam upapādyate. ittham eṣa 
siddhapratibandho hetuḥ dharmiṇi bhavet, na veti śa)kāyām upanayavacanam uccāryate. 
tadanantaraṃ sarvāvayavānām ekatropasaṃhārāya nigamanaṃ prayujyata ity anyatamasyā-
prayogāt nigrahārhatā bhavaty evety alam atraiva vastuni pade pade kalahaprastāvaneneti. 
(Dharmakīrti's assertion:) Here [Dharmakīrti] said, “According to [the fact] that asādhanā(ga-
vacana occurs from the component part, namely a thesis and the like, it is correct that [a debater] 
who does not state it (= a thesis and the like) is not defeated, and on the contrary [a debater] who 
states [it] is defeated.” (Jayanta's assertion:) This [Dharmakīrti's criticism] is answered [as follows]. 
This is abandoned immediately and [abandoned] in detail in the definition of the [five] component 
parts. That is to say, an inferential statement is used in order to stop the requirement of an audience. 
Therefore, to begin with, a property qualified by probandum that is an object of the [audience's] 
requirement is presented. Hence, when a ground is required, an expression of a logical reason 
(hetu) is stated. When [someone] desires to know what is empirically observed to have a 
relationship with this (= the logical reason), an example (udāhara&a) is provided. When there is 
doubt as to whether this logical reason of which relationship [with probandum] is proven in this 
manner may exist in the subject or not, an expression of an application (upanaya) is given. 
Immediately after it (= an expression of an application), in order to put all component parts 
together into one place, a conclusion (nigamana) is used. Because any one of [all the component 
parts mentioned above] is not used [by the debater], [he] is to be worthy of defeat. Therefore, in 
regard to the above matter, stop starting controversy on every occasion! 
 
Jayanta flatly objected to Dharmakīrti's assertion because all five component parts are essential to 
an inferential statement based on the Nyāya school's logic. However, as to the logical reason and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
was already stated. And the affair [which should be proven] is comprehended only by it (= the logical 
reason which has the definition mentioned above). Therefore, the example does not exist separately 
[from the logical reason] as a certain part of the means of proof. Hence, the definition of it (= the 
example) is not stated separately [from the definition of the logical reason] because the meaning [of the 
definition of the example] is obtained [from the definition of the logical reason].) 
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example, Dharmakīrti's comprehension is similar to Jayanta's opinion. Therefore, Jayanta's objection 
seems to be excessive. 
 
3.3. Consideration of “Surplus” (adhika) 
The twelfth condition of defeat defined in NS is “surplus” (adhika). 
 
NS 5.2.13 (Ci' VN 49,15): hetūdāharaṇādhikam adhikam // 
“Surplus” (adhika) is [an inferential statement] which has a surplus logical reason and example. 
 
“Surplus” can be explained as follows25: Even if a debater states an inferential statement which 
has a surplus logical reason and example, the surplus component parts are useless because proof of 
probandum can be established by only one logical reason and example. Therefore, the debater stating 
such an inferential statement is to be defeated because of “surplus,” the twelfth condition of defeat. 
In regard to this assertion of the Nyāya school, Dharmakīrti conditionally admitted the “surplus” 
to be a correct condition of defeat. 
 
VN 49,18–20: yatraikasādhanavākyaprayogapūrvako vicāraḥ, tatrādhikābhidhānam anarthakam iti 
nigrahasthānam. prapañcakathāyāṃ tu na kaścid doṣo niyamābhāvād iti.   
When consideration postulates usage of an inferential statement, [“surplus” is] the condition of 
defeat because it is useless to state the surplus [component parts]. But there is not any fault 
because there is no restriction26 in the expansive discussion (prapañcakathā). 
 
“Surplus” (adhika) evidently should be identified with the condition of defeat for a proponent in 
VN. Furthermore, it is appropriate that asādhanā(gavacana in this case is resolved into 
asādhanā(gasya vacanam (the third, fourth, and fifth interpretation of asādhanā(gavacana) because 
“surplus” is explained as “stating the surplus logical reason and example.” Especially, “surplus” is not 
different from the third interpretation of asādhanā(gavacana, i.e., “stating a second positive 
concomitance or a second negative concomitance,” in the sense that both of these two mean “stating 
what is not the element of a means of proof.” Therefore, we should conclude that “surplus” corresponds 
                                                                  
25 See VN 49,15–17. 
26 The expansive discussion (prapañcakathā) has no restriction which makes the debater employ only 
one inferential statement. 
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with the third interpretation of asādhanā(gavacana, except in the case of the expansive discussion 
(prapañcakathā). 
 
NM 2.700.5: etac ca kīrtināpy evam eva kathitam prapaṃcakathāyāṃ tu na doṣaḥ iti. 
And as to this (= “surplus”), Dharmakīrti also said “but there is no fault in the expansive 
discussion” in the same way. 
 
Jayanta welcomed Dharmakīrti's acceptance of the Nyāya school's thought. 
 
3.4. Consideration of “Lack of an Idea” (apratibhā) 
The sixteenth condition of defeat defined in NS is “lack of an idea” (apratibhā). 
 
NS 5.2.18 (Ci' VN 58,15): uttarasyāpratipattir apratibhā // 
“Lack of an idea” means “not hitting on any idea of an answer.” 
 
“Lack of an idea” can be explained as follows27: When an opponent is unable to formulate an 
answer in response to the assertion of a proponent, he cannot negate the proponent's position. Therefore, 
such an opponent is to be defeated because of “lack of an idea,” the sixteenth condition of defeat. 
In regard to this assertion of the Nyāya school, Dharmakīrti wholly admitted the “lack of an idea” 
to be a correct condition of defeat. 
 
VN 58,17–20: sādhanavacanānantaraṃ prativiṣayam uttare vyarthaṃ tadajñānakramaghoṣaṇa-
ślokapāṭhādinā kālaṃ gamayan kartavyāpratipattyā nigrahārha iti nyāyyaṃ nigrahasthānam iti.  
Immediately after [a proponent] states a piece of proof28, [an opponent] spending useless time 
[searching] for the answer to each topic through [actions] such as repeating [the whole assertion of 
the proponent] in [correct] sequence29 or reciting verse without any idea for it (= an answer) is 
                                                                  
27 See VN 58,15–16. 
28 See VA 123,15: sādhanavacanānantara(1) prativādinā dūṣaṇaṃ vaktavyam. ((1) sādhanavacanā° 
em. : sādhana vacanā° VA.) (Immediately after [a proponent] states a piece of proof, an opponent has to 
state an objection.) 
29 See VA 123,15–16: sarvānukramānubhāṣaṇena. (by repeating the whole [assertion of a proponent] 
in correct sequence.) Dharmakīrti denied it to be necessary that the opponent repeats the whole 
assertion of the proponent in correct sequence when “lack of repetition” (ananubhā"a&a), i.e., the 
fourteenth condition of defeat defined by the Nyāya shcool, is considered at VN 53,17–18. 
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worthy of defeat because he does not perform that which he should (= refutation of the proponent's 
proof). Therefore, [“lack of an idea” is] the correct condition of defeat. 
 
According to the system of debate in VN, “lack of an idea” is ado"odbhāvana, i.e., the condition 
of defeat for an opponent. And the first interpretation of ado"odbhāvana, “not pointing out the fault,” is 
appropriate in this case because “lack of an idea” means “not hitting on any idea of an answer.” That is 
to say, we should conclude that “lack of an idea” corresponds with the first interpretation of 
ado"odbhāvana.30 
 
NM 2.707.13–14: kīrtir api caitad anumanyata eva nigrahasthānam. 
And Dharmakīrti also indeed approves this (= “lack of an idea”) as a condition of defeat. 
 
Jayanta welcomed Dharmakīrti's acceptance of the Nyāya school's thought. 
 
3.5. Consideration of “Fallacious Logical Reason” (hetvābhāsa) 
The twenty-second condition of defeat defined in NS is “fallacious logical reason” (hetvābhāsa). 
 
NS 5.2.24 (Ci' VN 68,1): hetvābhāsāś ca yathoktāḥ // 
And “fallacious logical reasons” are [the same] as previously stated. 
 
“Fallacious logical reason” is defined in the previous section of the Nyāyasūtra, i.e., NS 1.2.4–9. 
Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, and Dharmakīrti also31 did not explain or examine this term in detail when 
considering the condition of defeat. However, according to the Nyāya school's definition, “fallacious 
logical reason” is regarded as a condition of defeat. 
In regard to this assertion of the Nyāya school, Dharmakīrti admits that “fallacious logical reason” 
is a correct condition of defeat. 
 
VN 68,6–9: atrāpi yathoktaṃ kṛtvā cintyam eva, kiṃ te yathālakṣitaprabhedās tathaiva, āhosvid 
                                                                  
30 Śāntarakṣita also considered the “lack of an idea” to be ado"odbhāvana. See VA 123,13–14: sādhv 
etan nigrahasthānam. ata evāsmābhir apīdam adoṣodbhāvanaṃ ity atroktam ity etat matvā 'bhyanujānāti. 
(This is a right condition of defeat. For this very reason, we also state that this is ado"odbhāvana. After 
thinking thus, [we] approve [it].) See Much [1991: 99, Anm. 405]. 
31 Cf. VN 68,1–5. 
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anyatheti. tat tu cintyamānam ihātiprasajyata iti na pratanyate. hetvābhāsāś ca yathānyāyaṃ 
nigrahasthānam ity etāvanmātram iṣṭam iti.  
In this case also, according to the remark “as previously stated,” whether they (= “fallacious 
logical reasons”) are the same as divisions defined [by the Nyāya school] or not has to be 
considered. But if it is considered here, [we will] fall into the occasion of [making] too [detailed 
consideration]. Therefore, [we will] not amplify [this topic]. [Instead we] just mean that 
“fallacious logical reasons” are conditions of defeat in accordance with logic. 
 
Without the need for consideration, we can conclude that “fallacious logical reason” corresponds 
with the fourth interpretation of asādhanā(gavacana, in which the meaning of “stating the fallacious 
logical reason” is included. 
 
NM 2.717.12: eteṣāṃ dharmakīrter api ca na vimatiḥ nigrahasthānatāyām. 
And Dharmakīrti also has no disagreement [with us] as to [the notion that] these (= “fallacious 
logical reasons”) are conditions of defeat. 
 
Jayanta welcomed Dharmakīrti's acceptance of the Nyāya school's thought. 
 
4. Jayanta's Comprehension of Nigrahasthāna put forth by Dharmakīrti 
Overall, Jayanta interpreted Dharmakīrti's definition of the condition of defeat as stated below. 
 
NM 2.680.17–2.681.9: doṣānudbhāvanam apratipattiḥ, viparītadoṣodbhāvanaṃ vipratipattiḥ. evam 
asādhanā)gavacanam api vikalpanīyam. prasajyapratiṣedhavṛttyā sādhanā)gasyāvacanaṃ cet, 
seyam apratipattiḥ. paryudāsavṛttyā sādhanā)gād anyac cet vacanam, seyaṃ vipratipattiḥ. ataḥ 
śabdāntareṇākṣapādapādebhya eva śiśikṣitvā, tad eva nigrahasthānadvayam anena śloke dvayena 
nibaddham, na punar abhinavam alpam api kiṃcid utprekṣitam iti. na ca yathāsaṃkhyaniyamena 
dvayor dve nigrahasthāne varṇanīye, api tu yathāsaṃbhavam ubhayor api yathāvasaraṃ tat tan 
nigrahasthānam ādeṣṭavyam. dvāviṃśatibhedatvaṃ ca nigrahasthānānām asa)kīrṇodāharaṇa-
vivakṣayā kathyate, na niyamāyety uktam eva. parasparavisadṛśaṃ ca lakṣaṇam eṣāṃ idānīm 
upadiśyata eva. tatraiva cāyuktatvam eṣām, bāliśapralāpakalpatvaṃ vā parākriyata evety alam 
atiprasa)gena. 
“Non-understanding” (apratipatti) is “not pointing out a fault,” [and] “misunderstanding” 
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(vipratipatti) is “pointing out a wrong fault.” Asādhanā(gavacana also has to be sorted out in this 
way. If [asādhanā(gavacana means] “not stating sādhanā(ga” by a function of direct negation 
(prasajyaprati"edha), this [corresponds with] “non-understanding.” [On the other hand], if 
[asādhanā(gavacana means] “stating a different thing from sādhanā(ga” by a function of indirect 
negation (paryudāsa), this [corresponds with] “misunderstanding.” Therefore, in the hope of 
studying [them] through the expression which is different from Akṣapāda's lines, these very two 
conditions of defeat (= “non-understanding” and “misunderstanding”) are connected with these 
two [conditions of defeat] (= asādhanā(gavacana and ado"odbhāvana) in the verse. However, any 
new [information], even if it is a trifling matter, is not expected [in the verse about 
asādhanā(gavacana and ado"odbhāvana]. Furthermore, it is not needed to describe the two 
conditions of defeat (= asādhanā(gavacana and ado"odbhāvana) [corresponding] with the two 
[conditions of defeat] (= “non-understanding” and “misunderstanding”) on the basis of the 
restriction of numbers (= the first to the first and the second to the second). If anything, depending 
on the situation, this and that condition of defeat (=asādhanā(gavacana and ado"odbhāvana) 
should be [respectively] specified in accordance with the possibility as to both 
[“non-understanding” and “misunderstanding”]. And it was indeed stated that the conditions of 
defeat were conveyed as twenty-two kinds of divisions because of the desire to express examples 
without [mutual] confusion but were not [conveyed] in terms of the limitation [of numbers of 
twenty-two kinds]. At that moment it is necessarily instructed that the definitions of these 
[conditions of defeat] are mutually different. In that very case it is also necessarily rejected that 
these [conditions of defeat] are not correct or are foolish small talk. Therefore, stop falling into 
[saying] too much. 
 
Jayanta's purpose here is to reinterpret asādhanā(gavacana and ado"odbhāvana, which are 
concepts established by Dharmakīrti, by a function of direct negation (prasajyaprati"edha) and indirect 
negation (paryudāsa).32 He intended to have these two concepts included into “non-understanding” 
(apratipatti) and “misunderstanding” (vipratipatti), which are defined in NS. The way of his 
                                                                  
32 As for ado"odbhāvana, Prameyakamalamārta&a and Pramā&amīmā%sā also interprets this term by 
a function of prasajyaprati"edha and paryudāsa. PKM 674,16–19 (= PM 82,18–20): yac cedam, adoṣo-
dbhāvanam ity asya vyākhyānam. prasajyapratiṣedhe doṣodbhāvanābhāvamātram adoṣodbhāvanam, 
paryudāse tu doṣābhāsānām anyadoṣāṇāṃ codbhāvanaṃ prativādino nigrahasthānam iti?Furethermore, 
one says as follows: this [term], namely, ado"odbhāvana is explained. [When this term is interpreted 
by] direct negation, merely “not pointing out the fault [of proponent's assertion]” is ado"odbhāvana. On 
the other hand, [when this term is interpreted by] indirect negation, “pointing out the pseudo-faults and 
other faults” is [ado"odbhāvana]. [Thus explained ado"odbhāvana is] the condition of defeat of an 
opponent.) 
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interpretation is arranged below in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 
Jayanta's reinterpretation of asādhanāgavacana and adoodbhāvana 
Nyāya's nigrahasthāna Dharmakīrti's nigrahasthāna 
 
 apratipatti 
 sādhanā(gasya avacanam  
?  (asādhanā(gavacana interpreted by means of prasajyaprati"edha)  
  do"asya anudbhāvanam  
?  (ado"odbhāvana interpreted by means of prasajyaprati"edha)   
 
 vipratipatti 
 asādhanā(gasya vacanam  
?  (asādhanā(gavacana interpreted by means of paryudāsa)  
  ado"asya udbhāvanam  
?  (ado"odbhāvana interpreted by means of paryudāsa)  
 
According to Jayanta, asādhanā(gavacana and ado"odbhāvana are created not for the purpose of 
adding some new information to apratipatti and vipratipatti, but for the purpose of a different approach 
through putting apratipatti and vipratipatti in another way. 
Dharmakīrti criticized the Nyāya school's “conditions of defeat” for mutual overlaps and rejected 
many conditions. However, Jayanta cleverly avoided this criticism by explaining that the twenty-two 
conditions of defeat defined in NS are not intended for the limitation of numbers but for expressing 
them clearly and without confusion. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The main points from Tables 1 through 5 are collected and arranged in Table 6 on the next page. 
This table helps to show how Jayanta interpreted the correspondence relationship of “the conditions of 
defeat” (nigrahasthāna) between NS and VN. 
In the position of VN, “insufficient” (nyūna) corresponds with the first and second interpretation 
of asādhanā(gavacana (sādhanā(gasya avacanam), and according to NM, sādhanā(gasya avacanam 
corresponds with “non-understanding” (apratipatti). However, as long as the first and second 
interpretation of asādhanā(gavacana are considered to correspond with “insufficient,” “insufficient” 
cannot be listed in this table because Jayanta flatly objected to Dharmakīrti's assertion regarding 
“insufficient”. 
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Table 6 
Jayanta's comprehension of the correspondence relationship of nigrahasthāna between NS and VN 
Jayanta's interpretation in NM Dharmakīrti's interpretation in VN agreed by Jayanta 
NS's terms VN's terms VN's terms NS's terms 
  
sādhanā(gasya  
1st interpretation of 
asādhanā(gavacana 
 
 
?11?“Insufficient” 
apratipatti 
 
avacanam 2nd interpretation of 
asādhanā(gavacana  
(nyūna) 
 do"asya 
anudbhāvanam 
 
1st interpretation of 
ado"odbhāvana 
?16?“lack of an idea” 
(apratibhā) 
  3rd interpretation of 
asādhanā(gavacana  
?12?“surplus” 
 (adhika) 
 
vipratipatti 
asādhanā(gasya 
vacanam 
4th interpretation of 
asādhanā(gavacana 
 
?22?“fallacious logical reason” 
(hetvābhāsa) 
  5th interpretation of 
asādhanā(gavacana  
 
?6?“different affair” 
 ado"asya 
udbhāvanam 
2nd interpretation of 
ado"odbhāvana  
 (arthāntara)33 
 
Traditionally, the Nyāya school classified the twenty-two conditions of defeat into apratipatti and 
vipratipatti in its own way. However, isn't the traditional way of classification contrary to Table 6? We 
have to consider this problem through the following text. 
 
NM 2.679.09–10 (Ce'e NBh 404,5–6)34: atrānanubhāṣaṇam ajñānam apratibhā vikṣepaḥ pary-
anuyojyopekṣaṇam iti apratipattyā saṃgṛhītāni; śeṣāṇi vipratipattyā. 
Among these [twenty-two conditions of defeat], “lack of repetition” (ananubhā"a&a), “lack of 
                                                                  
33  To be more accurate, when considering Jayanta's miscomprehension in NM 2.693.4–8, it is 
problematic to list the correspondence relationship between “different affair” and the 5th interpretation 
of asādhanā(gavacana or the 2nd interpretation of ado"odbhāvana in Table 6. See footnote 13 for 
details. 
34 NBh 404,5–6: tatrānanubhāṣaṇam ajñānam apratibhā vikṣepo matānujñā paryanuyojyopekṣaṇam ity 
apratipattir nigrahasthānam, śeṣas tu vipratipattir iti. (Among these [twenty-two conditions of defeat], 
“lack of repetition” (ananubhā"a&a), “lack of comprehension” (ajñāna), “lack of an idea” (apratibhā), 
“throw-out” (vik"epa), “Admitting the opinion” (matānujñā), and “overlooking what is blamable” 
(paryanuyojyopek"a&a) are [collected into] “non-understanding” (apratipatti), which is the condition of 
defeat; on the other hand, the rest are [collected into] “misunderstanding” (vipratipatti).) 
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comprehension” (ajñāna), “lack of an idea” (apratibhā), “throw-out” (vik"epa), and “overlooking 
what is blamable” (paryanuyojyopek"a&a) are collected into “non-understanding” (apratipatti) and 
the rest are [collected into] “misunderstanding” (vipratipatti). 
 
According to the explanation by NM which parallels NBh's sentence, among the conditions of 
defeat shown in Table 6, the sixteenth, “lack of an idea” (apratibhā), corresponds with 
“non-understanding” (apratipatti). The rest, namely the sixth, “different affair,” (arthāntara), the 
eleventh, “insufficient” (nyūna), the twelfth, “surplus” (adhika), and the twenty-second, “fallacious 
logical reason” (hetvābhāsa), correspond with “misunderstanding” (vipratipatti). The point to observe 
here is that this traditional way classifies “insufficient” into the “misunderstanding.” This classification, 
however, does not lead to an inconsistency in Table 6 because Jayanta objected to Dharmakīrti's 
interpretation of the “insufficient” as stated above, and hence Dharmakīrti's interpretation of the 
“insufficient” should not be listed in Table 6, which shows Jayanta's comprehension of the 
correspondence relationship of “the conditions of defeat” between NS and VN. 
Therefore, the result clearly shows that Jayanta consistently reimported Dharmakīrti's 
interpretation of the Nyāya school's doctrine into the traditional Nyāya school's theory, except for the 
condition “insufficient.” 
Jayanta resolved asādhanā(gavacana and ado"odbhāvana, which were concepts first devised by 
Dharmakīrti in VN, into "non-understanding" (apratipatti) and “misunderstanding” (vipratipatti), i.e., 
the traditional concepts in the doctrine of the Nyāya school. Furthermore, he welcomed and reimported 
Dharmakīrti's assertion in which some of the twenty-two conditions of defeat are admitted to be correct. 
By cleverly accepting Dharmakīrti's opinion, Jayanta showed the superiority of the Nyāya school’s 
theory over Dharmakīrti's position in VN through the statement that the latter has no new point of view 
compared to the former. 
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